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INTRODUCTION 
Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual 
property governed primarily by state law.  Trademarks, copyrights, 
and patents are each governed primarily by federal statutes.  Trade 
secrets, by contrast, are governed by fifty state statutes and 
common laws.  The result is that trade secret law differs from state 
to state.  It is time to eliminate these differences—and the 
significant problems they cause—by enacting a Federal Trade 
Secrets Act (“FTSA”). 
An FTSA is the next logical step in the evolution of trade 
secret law, which comprises a series of failed attempts to achieve 
uniformity.  These attempts include the Restatement of Torts in 
1939,1 which consolidated general principles of case law for state 
courts to embrace; the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) in 
1985,2 which advanced a model statute for state legislatures to 
enact; and the Economic Espionage Act in 1996,3 which 
federalized criminal trade secret law.  These attempts fall short 
because they rely on an inherently variable state-based system (the 
Restatement and UTSA) or because they unify only criminal trade 
secret law (the Economic Espionage Act).  The FTSA I propose in 
this Article is a complete solution.  It would both preempt 
 
 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (1939). 
 2 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).  
 3 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006). 
VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING 4/21/2009  7:58:33 PM 
2009] FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS ACT 771 
inconsistent state laws and unify criminal and civil trade secret 
law. 
There are four reasons to enact an FTSA: 
1. An FTSA would preempt state trade secret laws, 
thereby solving the problems caused by 
interstate differences.  These problems include 
costs of investigating these differences and 
devising business plans to accommodate them; 
economic inefficiencies from adopting and 
overseeing either a suboptimal, one-size-fits-all 
business plan or fifty optimal plans for fifty 
different states; and many others. 
2. There is no economic justification for keeping 
trade secret law at the state level, while an 
FTSA would boost the value of trade secret law 
to the U.S. economy, innovative employers, and 
mobile employees. 
3. An FTSA would help innovative small 
businesses, which rely disproportionately on 
trade secrets, instead of patents, to protect their 
intellectual property (or “IP”). 
4. An FTSA would create a unified federal IP 
regime.  This will encourage innovation and 
ensure a proper balance between trade secrets 
and other types of IP. 
I argue for an FTSA in three parts.  Part I is the history of how 
the current, state-based regime came about and why it fails to 
achieve uniformity.  Part II explains the four reasons for enacting 
an FTSA.  Part III lists the three arguments advanced against an 
FTSA and explains why those arguments are unpersuasive.  This 
Article concludes with a summary of the proposed FTSA, 
including the elements of an FTSA that are necessary to achieve 
the four benefits described in Part II. 
VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING 4/21/2009  7:58:33 PM 
772 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:769 
I. PROLOGUE: THE HISTORY OF TRADE SECRET LAW IS A SERIES 
OF FAILED ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY 
Confidential business information is as old as business itself, 
but “trade secrets” as such began in England in the early 1800s and 
in the United States in the mid-to-late 1800s.4  By the early 1900s, 
many core features of trade secret law had been established.5 
The first attempt to unify the nascent law of trade secrets was 
the Restatement of Torts in 1939.6  The Restatement summarized 
general principles of law with the hope that state courts would 
embrace those principles.7  The Restatement gained widespread 
acceptance, but it failed to achieve uniformity because the 
Restatement was not binding, and thus courts were free to accept 
or reject its various principles.8  So while most state courts cited 
 
 4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29 cmt. a (1995) (chronicling 
the early history of trade secret law); Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade 
Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual 
Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 483–87 (2000–01) (discussing the 
development of trade secrets and trade secret law) [hereinafter Fisk, Working 
Knowledge]. 
 5 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2:3 (2008) (discussing the history of 
trade secrets in U.S. courts). 
 6 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (1939).  Neither the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts nor Restatement (Third) of Torts contains a section on trade secrets.  
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated that the tort of trade secret 
misappropriation had developed into its own area of law and thus required individual 
treatment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, div. 9, introductory note (1979).  The 
current Restatement addressing trade secrets is the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (1995).  The 
rules in Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition are meant to apply to actions under 
either the UTSA or common law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 
cmt. a. 
 7 The American Law Institute, which was responsible for promulgating the 
Restatement (First) of Torts, was created to “address uncertainty in the law through a 
restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers what the law was.” 
American Law Institute, Institute Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction 
=about.instituteprojects (last visited Mar. 5, 2009); see also James Pooley, The Top Ten 
Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (1997) [hereinafter Pooley, Top 
Ten Issues]. 
 8 See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 
282 (1980–81) (“The Restatement was the first attempt to enunciate the generally 
accepted principles of trade secrets law.  Its principles became primary authority by 
adoption in virtually every reported case.”).  The National Conference cited uncertainty 
in the law of trade secrets as one of the justifications for the UTSA. UNIF. TRADE 
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the Restatement, those courts adopted different principles to 
different degrees.  Another reason for the Restatement’s failure to 
achieve uniformity was the uneven development of trade secret 
law, as states in commercial centers developed extensive case law 
while agricultural states had a leaner body of precedent.9 
The next attempt to unify trade secret law, the UTSA, 
abandoned the common law approach of the Restatement and 
proposed a model statute for state legislatures to adopt.  The UTSA 
was proposed in 1968, adopted in 1979, and amended in 1985.10  
Like the Restatement before it, the UTSA gained widespread 
acceptance.  It has been enacted, at least in part, by forty-six state 
legislatures.11 
The UTSA nonetheless fell short of its central purpose—to 
“make uniform the law” of trade secrets.12  To begin with, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Texas have not 
enacted it.13  These four states represent 22% of the U.S. Gross 
Domestic Product.14  And even among the forty-six states that have 
enacted it, differences remain because legislatures in those states 
have modified the UTSA and courts in those states have adopted 
 
SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005).  The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is the group responsible for the Uniform 
Commercial Code and other efforts to unify state law. Uniform Law Commission, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2009) (“The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has 
worked for the uniformity of state laws since 1892.”). 
 9 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005) (“[The] 
development [of state trade secret law] has been uneven.  Although there typically are a 
substantial number of reported decisions in states that are commercial centers, this is not 
the case in less populous and more agricultural jurisdictions.”). 
 10 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 369 (1985).  For an analysis of 
the UTSA, see Klitzke, supra note 8. 
 11 See JAGER, supra note 5, § 3:29 (providing citations to statutes in the forty-six states 
that have enacted the UTSA). 
 12 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005). 
 13 Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1633, 1650 n.99 (1998). 
 14 BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SLOWED IN 2007: ADVANCE 2007 AND REVISED 2004–2006 GDP-BY-STATE ESTIMATES 
(June 5, 2008), available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/ 
gdp_state/2008/pdf/gsp0608.pdf. 
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different interpretations.15  These modifications and interpretations 
have been catalogued elsewhere,16 but they include fundamental 
differences about what constitutes a trade secret, what is required 
to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available.  Finally, 
even in instances where states have enacted the UTSA, many state 
courts continue to rely on their own common law instead of the 
provisions of the UTSA.17  These and other facts caused a leading 
commentator to call the UTSA the “non-Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act,”18 and to suggest that “the state of trade secret law is today 
more conflicting and uncertain than it was in 1979” when the 
UTSA was adopted.19 
This was not meant to be.  By its own terms, the UTSA was 
intended to achieve uniformity.  Section 8 of the UTSA, titled 
“Uniformity of Application and Construction,” provides that: 
“[t]his [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this 
 
 15 Lao, supra note 13, at 1649–50. “[T]he UTSA never won the support of all of the 
states, and even the states that did not adopt the UTSA modified it, sometimes 
substantially, before enactment.  Consequently, despite the UTSA, the law on trade secret 
misappropriation continues to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Id. 
 16 See, e.g., 1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (2008) 
[hereinafter MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS] (discussing states’ interpretations of the 
UTSA); see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[1] (2008) [hereinafter POOLEY, 
TRADE SECRETS]; Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A New 
Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 191, 
196 (1997) (“While most states have enacted the UTSA in some form, the trade secret 
protection granted in each state is far from uniform relative to the other states.”); Rebel J. 
Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 443–45 
(1995). 
 17 See Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical 
Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 201 (2009) (arguing that the persistent use of the Restatement 
(First) of Torts is “remarkable considering the near-antiquity of the First Restatement, the 
statutory pre-emption (in most states) of any common law cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation, and the ostensibly superseding treatment of trade secret doctrine in the 
more recent (but seldom cited) Third Restatement of Unfair Competition”); Brandon B. 
Cate, Saforo & Assocs., Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret 
Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 714–15 (2000) (describing  examples in which state 
supreme courts have relied on  state common laws instead of the statutory requirements 
of the UTSA). 
 18 See Pooley, Top Ten Issues, supra note 7, at 1188. 
 19 POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 2.03[1]. 
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Act among states enacting it.”20  Section 8 has failed.  Several 
states did not include section 8 in the version of the UTSA they 
enacted.21  And in those states that have enacted it, courts often 
bypass its mandate of uniformity and adopt minority views.22 
The most recent step toward unification came in 1996 when 
Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act,23 which makes 
misappropriation of trade secrets a federal crime.  Congress passed 
the Act for several reasons, including the growing importance of 
trade secrets and the failure of existing state or federal laws to curb 
economic espionage (another name for trade secret 
misappropriation).24  But the backdrop for the Act was Congress’s 
frustration with state trade secret laws, which Congress 
complained “protect[] proprietary economic information only 
haphazardly.”25  Because the Act addressed only criminal 
misappropriation, Senator Arlen Spector suggested the need for a 
federal statute to address civil misappropriation: “We have been 
made aware that available civil remedies may not be adequate to 
the task and that a federal civil cause of action is needed.  This is 
an issue we need to study carefully, and will do so next year.”26  
“Next year” came and went, and Congress has yet to consider a 
civil FTSA.  
 
 20 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005). 
 21 Examples of states that have not enacted section 8 of the UTSA include Arkansas, 
Illinois, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 
(2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1 to 1065/9 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -
157 (2008); and 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301–08 (2008). 
 22 See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 790–92 
(Wis. 2006) (recognizing that Wisconsin has enacted section 8 but nonetheless has 
adopted a minority position on the issue of preemption). 
 23 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006). 
 24 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023–
25. 
 25 S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 11 (1996). 
 26 104 CONG. REC. S12201, S12208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Spector). 
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II. FOUR REASONS TO ENACT AN FTSA27 
A. An FTSA Would Solve the Inherent and Intractable Problem: 
There Can Be No Uniformity to a State-Based Trade Secret 
Regime 
The dominant failure of a state-based trade secret regime is that 
trade secret law differs from state to state.  Consequently, the most 
obvious benefit of the FTSA is that it will instantly accomplish 
what the common law, Restatement, UTSA, and Economic 
Espionage Act have all failed to achieve—uniformity, both 
substantive and procedural. 
1. The Problems Caused by a Lack of Substantive and 
Procedural Uniformity 
There is no denying that trade secret law differs from state to 
state.  Nor is there denying the problems such differences cause, 
the most obvious of which are the transaction costs such 
differences impose on courts and parties.  Litigants will use all 
available arguments to their advantage, and thus they have an 
incentive to find, emphasize, and litigate the variations in state 
trade secret laws.  This imposes costs on the courts, which must 
resolve these differences.  It also adds to the costs of litigation for 
the litigants themselves, as they must expend resources finding and 
litigating these differences. 
Another problem is investigatory costs.  When an entity 
decides to create or protect trade secret information, the entity 
must devise a plan.  To devise an optimal plan, the entity must 
investigate what laws protect what information.  These 
 
27  In this Article I advance what I consider to be the most persuasive reasons to enact 
an FTSA.  This Article does not seek to present all reasons that ostensibly support an 
FTSA.  For example, some commentators argue that the current trade secret regime 
causes the U.S. to breach its treaty obligations under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) because NAFTA and TRIPS set higher standards than those 
used in non-UTSA states. See, e.g., Lao, supra note 13, at 1674–79; Pace, supra note 16, 
at 449–56.  This concern, however, is more theoretical than practical.  Since NAFTA was 
signed in 1992 and TRIPS in 1994, there have been no complaints on this issue from any 
trading partners. 
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investigatory costs are particularly daunting for companies that do 
business in multiple states, for those companies must investigate 
the laws in each state.28  But these costs also affect all companies, 
as the vagaries of personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues 
mean that a trade secret owner rarely knows ex ante which 
jurisdiction’s laws will control.  Similarly, when employees move 
to new jobs, or when members of the public decide to access and 
use purported trade secrets, they must investigate to decide 
whether the information is protected.  To be sure, not every entity, 
employee, or member of the public investigates differences, either 
because they suspect that any differences would be immaterial or 
because the investigatory costs are too high.  But the point is that 
differences impose costs either way.  Being risk averse and making 
an informed decision imposes the costs of investigating 
differences.  Taking risks and making uninformed decisions also 
imposes costs, as uncertainty about which law applies leads to 
more litigation and fewer settlements. 
Even if an entity absorbs the requisite investigatory costs, 
interstate differences still cause economic inefficiencies in at least 
two ways.  One is the simple fact that implementing different trade 
secret plans for different states imposes unnecessary overhead.  
The other is that, if a company foregoes this overhead and adopts a 
company-wide plan, the plan is suboptimal because it works better 
in some states than others.  For example, while every state requires 
a trade secret owner to engage in efforts that are reasonable to 
maintain the secrecy of its trade secrets, what constitutes 
“reasonable efforts” can differ from state to state.29  The upshot of 
these differences is either the wasteful expenditure of resources 
 
 28 See, e.g., Pace, supra note 16, at 447 (making a similar argument that devising an 
approach to confidentiality “requires a company to expend significant resources on 
acquiring information about which states’ laws might apply to its trade secret and what 
those laws are”). 
 29 See generally David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the 
Concept “Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy,” 5 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1989) (discussing what legal and situational 
efforts are required of a trade secret owner to determine reasonableness).  Both the 
Restatement (First) of Torts and the UTSA impose an obligation on the trade secret 
owner to engage in reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of its trade secret. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 
U.L.A. 656 (2005). 
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(i.e., engaging in efforts that are unnecessary) or the loss of rights 
(i.e., foregoing efforts that turn out to be necessary).  And while an 
owner may be tempted to adopt a plan that meets the strictest 
standard, that too is inefficient.  Complying with the strictest 
common denominator means that the owner expends additional 
resources that it knows are unnecessary in at least some 
jurisdictions.30 
Finally, interstate differences systematically encourage a series 
of bad results: trade secret owners engage in less innovation; 
nefarious agents misappropriate trade secrets more often; and the 
public under-uses the public domain.  Trade secret owners must 
decide whether to create and protect trade secret information.  If 
protection is uncertain, or if it can be realized only after expensive 
litigation to resolve those uncertainties, the rational trade secret 
owner would undervalue trade secrets and thus may be less likely 
to innovate since that innovation will not be as valuable.31  The 
opposite is true for the nefarious agent.  If trade secret law is 
uncertain or expensive to enforce, the nefarious agent may seek to 
exploit those uncertainties by taking the risk that the trade secret 
owner will not enforce its rights.  There is thus an inverse 
relationship, all things being equal, between clarity of enforcement 
and likelihood of misappropriation.  Finally, for the public and 
former employees interested in pursuing information in the public 
domain, uncertainty regarding whether information is a trade secret 
makes that information less attractive.32  In such cases, the scope 
of a trade secret creeps beyond appropriately protected trade secret 
information and covers public-domain information. 
2. An FTSA Would Achieve Substantive Uniformity 
I will not catalogue all substantive differences among the 
states’ trade secret laws, as there are simply too many to mention.  
 
 30 See Pace, supra note 16, at 447 (making a similar efficiency argument). 
 31 See id. at 447–48 (making a similar argument that uncertainty creates less incentive 
to innovate). 
 32 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 338 (2008) (“If any idea, no matter how public, is subject to a claim of 
legal rights, individuals and companies will reasonably worry about using any 
information they do not themselves develop.”). 
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A complete list of these differences can be found elsewhere, such 
as in the annually updated, two-volume Trade Secrets: A State-by-
State Survey,33 or in previous articles that have critiqued interstate 
differences and called for uniformity.34 
Instead, I will state the obvious point that an FTSA would 
achieve substantive uniformity by preempting nonuniform state 
laws, which, in turn, would solve the significant problems such 
differences cause.  To be fair, there is debate about the scope of 
these problems, with some commentators arguing that any 
problems are minor.35  There is no clear resolution to this debate, 
as the problems are based on economic theory and thus difficult to 
quantify.  The bottom line is this.  If substantive differences create 
significant problems, an FTSA would be of tremendous benefit.  
But even if these problems were minor, an FTSA would still confer 
a benefit, albeit a smaller one. 
 
 33 Brian M. Malsberger, TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Richard Alfred 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006). 
 34 See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments 
to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 656–
57 (2008) (“The time has come for the enactment of a federal trade secrets statute.”); 
Lao, supra note 13, at 1649–79 (arguing for federalization based on the lack of 
uniformity between states, the importance of trade secrets to interstate commerce, the 
complexity of choice-of-law problems, and treaty obligations); Pace, supra note 16, at 
442–56 (arguing for an FTSA based on the need for substantive unity and compliance 
with treaty obligations); Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act: The States’ Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 95 (1990) 
(“[C]onsideration should be given to a federal statute to provide uniformity and clarity . . 
. .”).  See generally Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 
120 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1971) (arguing for a federal statute based in part on lack of 
uniformity and preemption concerns). 
 35 See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AIPLA TRADE 
SECRETS COMMITTEE (2007), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Section=Proposal_to_Federalize_Trade_Secret_
Law&Site=Trade_Secret_Law&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ontentID=7041 [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT] (claiming that the UTSA has resulted in 
significant harmonization); Halligan, supra note 34, at 670 (“[T]he UTSA has, for the 
most part, resulted in a very coherent and consistent body of trade secret law . . .   
[despite the fact that] there are still some glaring holes and discrepancies [among the 
states].”). 
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3. An FTSA Would Achieve Procedural Uniformity 
Each state has its own rules of civil procedure.  Rules of civil 
procedure differ between states as well as between state courts and 
federal courts.  For trade secret owners and their lawyers, and for 
alleged misappropriators and their lawyers, procedural disparities 
cause significant problems.  Enacting an FTSA would solve these 
problems because an FTSA would include certain procedural rules 
specific to trade secrets.  The UTSA has several such rules, 
including rules regarding protective orders and a statute of 
limitations.36  And where the FTSA would be silent, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure would provide a uniform set of default 
procedures. 
To illustrate the importance of procedural differences, consider 
the following three examples.  First, states have different rules 
regarding if, when, and how plaintiffs must identify their alleged 
trade secrets.37  “With all other types of IP, the subject matter is 
identified in publicly available material—a registered copyright or 
trademark, an issued patent, or a publicly available product.”38  But 
trade secrets, by definition, are secret and not publicly available 
and thus must be identified at some point in a trade secret case.  
While the identification issue comes up in every case, there is no 
consensus about when or how plaintiffs must identify their trade 
secrets.39  As a court recently stated, “courts have developed at 
least nine different approaches to the problem.”40  Identifying trade 
secrets is a big issue for both plaintiffs and defendants.  Plaintiffs 
often want to avoid identifying and thus limiting their trade secrets.  
 
 36 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 5–6, 14 U.L.A. 647–50 (2005). 
 37 Darin W. Snyder & David S. Almeling, Trade Secrets: The Identification Issue, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/ 
IdentificationIssue.pdf. 
 38 Id.; see Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret 
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
68, 73 (2006). 
 39 See Graves & Range, supra note 38, at 79–91 (cataloging ways and times in which 
courts do or do not require the identification of the allegedly misappropriated trade 
secret); Snyder & Almeling, supra note 37 (describing the trend that courts increasingly 
require plaintiffs to identify with particularity each allegedly misappropriated trade secret 
during the early stages of discovery). 
 40 DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
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Defendants often want plaintiffs to identify the alleged trade 
secrets as early and precisely as possible to frame the scope of 
discovery and to enable defendants to prepare their defenses.  It 
thus makes a significant difference whether a trade secret case is in 
a state like California, which requires by statute that the plaintiff 
must identify its trade secrets before discovery commences,41 or in 
a state like New York, which has no such statute and has been 
reluctant to impose a strict burden of identification.42 
A second procedural difference concerns whether the UTSA, 
enacted in some form in forty-six states, preempts causes of action 
for misappropriation of confidential information when that 
information does not qualify as a trade secret.  There is a split of 
authority on this issue.43  A few states, such as Wisconsin,44 find 
no preemption, while most states, such as New Hampshire, find 
preemption.45  These differences are important because they 
determine what causes of action a plaintiff can assert and what 
remedies are available. 
The third difference relates to choice-of-law problems.  Since 
trade secret law is state-based, many cases require a choice-of-law 
analysis to determine what substantive law to apply, the 
appropriate forum, and what remedies are available.46  As a 
litigator of trade secret cases, I have found that choice-of-law 
issues arise frequently and require substantial work.  An FTSA 
would solve these problems because choice-of-law issues arise 
 
 41 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210. 
 42 See, e.g., Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., No. 
5:03CV165(HGM/GLS), 2003 WL 1956214, at *3–4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003); see also 
Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 370–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 43 See generally Michael Ahrens, Wisconsin Confidential: The Mystery of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision in Burbank Grease Services v. Sokolowski and its 
Effect upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Litigation, and Employee Mobility, 2007 WIS. 
L. REV. 1271 (2007) (discussing a Wisconsin court’s holding that the USTA-based 
Wisconsin statute did not preempt Wisconsin civil law); Robert Unikel, Bridging the 
“Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of 
Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1998) (discussing the protection of confidential 
information in courts). 
 44 See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs. v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006). 
 45 See, e.g., Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652 (N.H. 2006). 
 46 See JAGER, supra note 5, §§ 4:6–4:8 (describing the range of choice-of-law issues 
that must be decided in each trade secret case). 
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only when state laws differ, and an FTSA would preempt those 
differences.  To be sure, there would continue to be choice-of-law 
issues that accompany trade secret litigation, such as if the 
complaint asserts theories under state employment or contract law.  
But removing the choice-of-law problems related to trade secret 
law will decrease the frequency with which these issues arise.47 
B. There is No Economic Reason to Keep Trade Secret Law at the 
State Level; but There are Many Economic Reasons to Make it 
Federal 
I have found no persuasive economic argument that supports 
keeping trade secret law as state law instead of federal law.  This is 
likely because there is nothing about trade secrets that is limited to 
a particular state.  Instead, trade secrets are information (a 
customer list, formula, method, etc.),48 and information exists 
wherever it is accessed or used.  Nor is there anything 
geographically limited about trade secret law.  A trade secret 
owner has an interest in its trade secret against anyone who 
misappropriates it within the applicable jurisdiction.  If the 
jurisdiction is a state, rights are limited to that state.  But if the 
jurisdiction is federal—as it would be under an FTSA—rights are 
nationwide.  Trade secrets thus present an even more compelling 
case for federalization than trademarks.  In trademark law, the 
 
 47 I do not claim that an FTSA would eliminate all forum shopping.  Nor do I claim 
that there won’t be regional differences if an FTSA is adopted, as regional courts of 
appeals may apply different interpretations of the FTSA.  Instead, I submit that if an 
FTSA is enacted, there will no longer be differences between trade secret laws in 
different states.  I further submit that the differences between varying interpretations of 
an FTSA in different federal circuits is likely to be less significant than the current 
differences in statutory trade secret laws in different states, and that varying 
interpretations of the FTSA would be short-lived as the U.S. Supreme Court could grant 
certiorari to resolve such differences. 
 48 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Id. 
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original trademark owner can have rights to a trademark that are 
confined to a particular location, such as a town or state; another 
trademark owner can have rights to the same trademark in another 
location.49  Trade secrets are never so limited. 
In sharp contrast to the lack of economic justification for the 
status quo, there would be substantial economic benefits to an 
FTSA.  The most immediate is the large and growing importance 
of trade secrets to the U.S. economy.50  Estimates vary, but the 
most recent report is that as much as 75% of the market value of a 
U.S. company resides in its IP assets.51  As strong evidence of the 
value of trade secrets, corporations spent $95 billion in 2005 trying 
to protect their confidential information.52  Yet thefts continue.  
The best available data shows that in 2005, more than 60% of U.S. 
companies reported an attempt to compromise their trade secret 
information.53  In quantifying the costs of trade secret losses, some 
statistics place the amount as high as $300 hundred billion per 
year.54  To provide examples for these numbers, consider the trade 
 
 49 See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 26 (4th ed. 2008) (detailing the territorial rules regarding trademark 
rights). 
 50 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 167 
(2008) (arguing, based on survey evidence from R&D lab and company managers, “that 
outside the pharmaceutical industry, where the regulatory system effectively forces 
revelation, trade secrecy is considerably more important than patent”). 
 51 ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.  ASIS International is 
a professional organization for security professionals. Id.  It conducted seven surveys 
since 1991, with the 2007 survey being the most recent. Id.  
 52 Joseph Pisani, Spy vs. Spy: Corporate Espionage, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2006/tc20060929_557426.htm 
(citing a study from Freedonia Group, a market research company). 
 53 ASIS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 51, at 2. 
 54 OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2002 vii 
(2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/2002.pdf.  Other studies find different 
numbers, depending on their methodology. See also AM. SOC’Y FOR INDUS. 
SEC./PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS: SURVEY 
REPORT (1999) (reporting $45 billion in costs due to theft of trade secrets); HEDIEH 
NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 59 (2004) (citing several studies 
concerning losses to the U.S. economy from trade secrets, including one conducted by 
ASIS estimating the loss at $300 billion); The Costs of Corporate Espionage, Posting to 
The Trade Secrets Blog, http://thetradesecretsblog.wordpress. 
com/2007/12/03/the-costs-of-corporate-espionage/ (Dec. 3, 2007). 
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secret formula for Coca-Cola,55 or consider trade secret cases that 
have settled for hundreds of millions of dollars.56 
The development of our information-based economy is further 
justification for an FTSA.  The U.S. economy is increasingly based 
on ideas and information,57 and companies increasingly rely on IP 
rights to protect their competitive advantages.58 Among the various 
types of IP, trade secrets are well suited to protect new ideas and 
information because trade secret law is not limited to a particular 
subject matter.59  Any information can qualify as a trade secret.60  
This flexibility makes trade secrets a good form of protection for 
rapidly evolving technologies.  As noted by one prominent 
commentator on trade secret law, “trade secrets have gained 
importance because in many fields, the technology is changing so 
 
 55 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 
(D. Del. 1985) (“The complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade secrets 
in the world.”); see also Coca-Cola Still World’s Top Brand, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4706275.stm (discussing Coca-Cola’s value). 
 56 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, $1.1 Billion TRUCE Surprise End to Feud over Trade 
Secrets, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1B, available at 
http://www.me.utexas.edu/~me179/topics/tradesecrets/case2articles/case2article3.html 
(discussing a $1.1 billion settlement involving trade secrets). 
 57 See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839, 857 (2005) [hereinafter Fisk, Knowledge Work]. 
Virtually every observer from every possible perspective agrees that 
changes in the economy of industrial and postindustrial nations and 
the world as a whole have increased the importance of intellectual 
capital. . . .  Compared to fifty years ago, even those who still sell or 
manufacture things (as opposed to knowledge) spend a greater 
proportion of dollars per unit of output on knowledge than they do on 
raw materials or labor. 
Id. 
 58 See generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Property Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 7 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
 59 Michael A. Epstein, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.02[E] (5th ed. Supp. 
2009) (“One of the advantages arising from the standards required for a trade secret to 
exist is that . . . there is no specific subject matter criterion for a trade secret.”). 
 60 Id. (“As long as the definitional requirements are met, virtually any subject matter of 
information can be a trade secret.” (citation omitted)); see also MILGRIM ON TRADE 
SECRETS, supra note 16, § 1.01[1] (discussing the definition of a trade secret). 
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rapidly that it is outstripping the existing laws intended to 
encourage and protect inventions and innovations.”61   
This explanation is not pure speculation.  Rather, it is the 
justification articulated by Congress for passing the Economic 
Espionage Act62 and federalizing criminal trade secret law.63  
Congress stated: “As this Nation moves into the high-technology, 
information age, the value of these intangible assets will only 
continue to grow.”64  Since then, U.S. government reports have 
confirmed that, as the U.S. economy continues to depend more on 
IP such as trade secrets, the need to protect such IP continues to 
increase.65  These considerations are not limited to criminal trade 
secret law, and thus they apply equally to the FTSA I propose.  
And while the Economic Espionage Act is an important step in 
trade secret law, it does not obviate the need for a civil trade 
secrets act for a host of reasons.  These reasons include: volume 
(there have been less than 100 cases under the Act); the Act does 
not provide for civil damages; the prosecutor, not the victim trade 
secret owner, decides whether to initiate prosecution; and there is a 
significantly higher burden of proof for criminal conviction than 
civil liability.66 
Technological change is another reason to pass an FTSA.  
Trade secret thefts were at one time local and involved the breach 
of a particular physical location.  The Internet and computer 
networking mean that misappropriators can now breach security 
 
 61 JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:1. 
 62 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006). 
 63 Id. § 1832; see S. REP. 104-359, at 6–7 (1996). 
 64 S. REP. 104-359, at 6 (1996). 
 65 See generally NAT’L INTELL. PROP. L. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION (2006), available at http://www. 
commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Gutierrez/2006_Releases/September/2006%20IP%20
report.pdf (discussing the importance of enforcing intellectual property rights in order to 
protect and encourage the development of innovations in fields such as technology, 
health, and safety). 
 66 For a good discussion of these limitations of the Economic Espionage Act, and why 
these and other limitations counsel in favor of federalizing trade secret law, see Halligan, 
supra note 34, at 661–76. 
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from anywhere in the world.67  The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act68 is evidence of this worldwide threat and the need for national 
legislation.  The Act, enacted in 1984, imposes civil and criminal 
liability for a wide variety of intentional, unauthorized access to 
computers.  It is not, however, a substitute for trade secret law. 
An FTSA would not only protect companies, it would also 
benefit employees.  This dual benefit is no accident, as the goals of 
trade secret law are both to protect employers “by providing 
remedies for the misuse of confidential information” and to benefit 
employees “by defining and legitimizing zones of information that 
mobile employees may freely take from job to job.”69  An FTSA 
would protect employees for the same reasons it would protect 
employers.  It would provide clear, uniform rules so that both 
employers and employees can be certain about what constitutes a 
trade secret and what can be taken from job to job.  Protecting 
employee mobility is critical because Americans are increasingly 
mobile.  One government study found that a person who was born 
in the later years of the baby boom would hold, on average, 10.8 
jobs from age eighteen to age forty-two.70 
C. An FTSA Would Help Innovative Small Businesses, Which Rely 
Disproportionately on Trade Secrets to Protect Their IP 
Study after study confirms that small businesses rely 
disproportionately on trade secrets, instead of patents, to protect 
their innovations.71  The reasons for this are cost and 
 
 67 See ERIC M. DOBRUSIN & RONALD A. KRASNOW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CULTURE: STRATEGIES TO FOSTER SUCCESSFUL PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN 
EVERYDAY BUSINESS 234 (2008) (“With [new ideas and the Internet] also grew the 
opportunity for misappropriation of the ideas and the technological means for achieving 
such misappropriations.”). 
 68 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 69 Graves & Range, supra note 38, at 44. 
 70 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, Number 
of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth among the Youngest Baby 
Boomers: Results from a Longitudinal Survey 1 (June 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf. 
 71 See Cohen, supra note 58, at 14–16; MARY ELLEN MOGEE, SMALL BUS. ADMIN, 
FOREIGN PATENTING BEHAVIOR OF SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS: AN UPDATE 5 (2003), 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs228_tot.pdf (collecting studies that find that small 
businesses use the patent system less often and less effectively than large businesses); 
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sophistication.  Patents are expensive to obtain, keep, and enforce, 
and they require sophisticated legal counsel at each step.72  Small 
businesses are less likely to know about and be able to bear these 
costs.73 
In contrast, there are no formal requirements to obtaining a 
trade secret, as trade secrets exist without any specific filing 
procedure.74  The only time that a trade secret must be identified is 
when it is used, such as in litigation or licensing.  And while 
keeping a trade secret does require efforts that are reasonable under 
the circumstances to ensure its secrecy, reasonableness is a 
flexible, relatively lax standard.75  Patents, by contrast, require the 
monitoring and payment of maintenance fees (due 3½, 7½ and 
11½ years after issuance of the patent) that, if missed, can result in 
the loss of rights.76  Finally, at enforcement, trade secret litigation 
is less expensive than patent litigation.77  All of these 
considerations make trade secrets an attractive alternative for small 
businesses. 
 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS GAO-02-189, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FEDERAL ACTION NEEDED TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES ADDRESS 
FOREIGN PATENT CHALLENGES 21–24 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d02789.pdf (describing numerous reasons why small businesses have more 
difficulty than large businesses obtaining foreign patents) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE]; see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 
(1987) (discussing which industries require patent protection and which require trade 
secret protection); Roger M. Milgrim, Sear to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other 
Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17 (1971) (discussing the distinction between trademarks and 
trade secrets). 
 72 Cohen, supra note 58, at 14–16. 
 73 MOGEE, supra note 71, at 5–6; see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 71, at 
21–24; David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 61, 63 (1991) 
 74 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
 75 Id. at 179–80 (“[Reasonableness] depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that 
will vary from case to case . . . .”). 
 76 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006). 
 77 See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 25–26 (2007) 
(reporting the average cost of various types of IP litigation, and showing that the cost to 
take a high-end patent litigation to trial costs about $5 million per side while the same 
statistic for high-end trade secret litigation is $1.75 million per side).  
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There is also evidence that trade secret theft threatens small 
businesses more than large ones.78  There could be several reasons 
for this.  One is that small businesses are less stable and experience 
more employee turnover, creating more opportunities for theft 
from departing employees.  Another is that small businesses have 
fewer resources to weather the loss of trade secret information, 
especially if that information was the source of the business’s 
competitive advantage. 
There are many reasons to help small businesses protect their 
IP.  Small businesses are an undeniably important part of the U.S. 
economy, as more than 99% of American businesses are small 
businesses and those businesses account for more than half of U.S. 
GDP.79  Small businesses are also a significant part of the 
innovative economy, as their size and culture make them nimble 
and able to respond to change.  Empirical studies confirm the 
disproportionate role small businesses play in innovation, as 
statistics show they develop thirteen times more patents per 
employee than large businesses.80 
D. An FTSA is Necessary to Create a Unified Federal IP Regime, 
Which in Turn Will Advance Innovation Policy 
Because trade secrets are the only major type of IP not already 
governed primarily by federal law, adopting an FTSA would 
consolidate IP law in the hands of Congress and the federal courts.  
Before addressing why IP should be consolidated at the federal 
level, it is important to explain why this has not been done already. 
The U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1787 and contained a 
clause for patents and copyrights.81  Their inclusion was not 
surprising because both had long-established statutory predicates.  
 
 78 See STEVEN FINK, STICKY FINGERS: MANAGING THE GLOBAL RISK OF ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE 198 (2002).  Fink describes survey data that “small-sized to medium-sized 
businesses suffer the most significant losses.” Id. 
 79 SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, FOR DATA YEAR 2006: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1, 9 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/ 
advo/research/sb_econ2007.pdf. 
 80 CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SMALL SERIAL 
INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 3 (2003), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf. 
 81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Copyright law dates back to England’s Statute of Anne in 1710.82  
And early patent laws included the Venetian Statute of 147483 and 
England’s Statute of Monopolies in 1623.84  Trademark law, by 
contrast, was not included in the U.S. Constitution.  This omission 
was due, at least in part, to the fact that trademark law only gained 
prominence after the U.S. Constitution was adopted.  Beginning in 
the early 1800s, courts expanded the torts of fraud and deceit to 
include trademark-like rights, and by 1850 rules regarding 
trademark infringement were well accepted.85  Shortly thereafter in 
1870, Congress passed the first federal trademark Act.86  While 
that Act was held unconstitutional, Congress subsequently passed 
narrower federal trademark acts in 1881 and 1905, and the 
expanded, modern trademark Act in 1946.87  The purpose of the 
1946 Act “was to codify and unify the common law of unfair 
competition and trademark protection.”88 
Trade secret law is the newest type of IP.  As detailed in Part I, 
it was recognized in America in the mid-to-late 1800s and gained 
prominence in the early 1900s.  The evolution of trade secret law 
thus resembles (with a lag) trademark law.  That is, trade secret 
law began in common law and gradually developed as it became 
more important.  It is time for trade secret law to complete its 
evolution, like trademark law, with a federal statute. 
By consolidating the four types of IP law at the federal level, 
an FTSA would be the final step toward a unified IP regime.  This 
unification would, in turn, help achieve better innovation policy 
 
 82 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 83 See Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Juridical Origins of the International Patent System: 
Towards a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization, 5 J. HIST. INT’L L. 
403, 413–14 (2003). 
 84 Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). 
 85 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, § 5:2 (chronicling the history of trademark law in 
England and the United States). 
 86 See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879) (“[T]he first . . . attempt 
by Congress to regulate the right of trade-marks is to be found in the act of July 8, 
1870.”). 
 87 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 847 n.1 (1982).  For more 
information on the development of trademark law, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 617–19 (2006). 
 88 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 861 n.2 (White, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333 
(1946)) (emphasis added). 
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because it would consolidate in one entity—first Congress, and 
then the federal courts—the power to define the scope of all major 
categories of IP.  Congress legislates in the patent,89 trademark,90 
and copyright91 arenas and oversees the U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office92 and the U.S. Copyright Office.93  These roles make 
Congress well positioned to craft and delimit an FTSA to work in 
tandem with the other types of IP law. 
After an FTSA is enacted, the federal courts would further 
Congress’s efforts to advance a better innovation policy.  The 
courts’ role is important because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized, the core purpose of both patent and trade secret law is 
to provide incentives to invent.94  A successful innovation policy is 
the core but not the sole aim of trade secret law.  Other goals 
include reducing protection costs, ensuring privacy, and permitting 
employee mobility.95  Trade secret law is thus complex and, at 
times, conflicting.  For example, the policy of encouraging a 
company to innovate (by having strong rights to protect trade 
secrets) conflicts with the policy of permitting employee mobility 
(by having weaker rights so employees can take knowledge from 
job to job).  To complicate matters further, trade secret law can 
 
 89 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006) (federal patent statute). 
 90 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006) (federal trademark statute). 
 91 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (federal copyright statute). 
 92 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2009) (explaining background of the U.S. Patent & Trademark office). 
 93 U.S. Copyright Office, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2009) (explaining background of the U.S. Copyright office). 
 94 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–84 (1974) (discussing 
objectives of patent and trade secret law); see also Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and 
Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 207, 211–13 (2008) (“Consequently, trade secret protection involves the same 
fundamental policy choices between favoring innovation and favoring competition as 
laws protecting other forms of IP.”); Lemley, supra note 32, at 331 (discussing Kewanee 
and arguing that trade secret law serves to incentivize innovation). 
 95 See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 1.02 (listing and discussing the 
various policies behind trade secret law).  I accept the commonly held belief that trade 
secret law incentivizes companies to innovate.  I nonetheless note that there is no 
universal agreement that trade secret law achieves this goal. See generally Robert G. 
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. 
REV. 241 (1998) (arguing that trade secret law lacks a convincing policy justification). 
VOL19_BOOK3_ALMELING 4/21/2009  7:58:33 PM 
2009] FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS ACT 791 
overlap with other types of IP.96  The result is that IP law requires 
courts to engage in a delicate balance to protect the rights of IP 
holders without unduly limiting the rights of others.  Again, 
consolidating the weighing of these decisions in the hands of the 
federal courts, which already have expertise in the other areas of IP 
law, would lead to even greater expertise.  It would also remove 
trade secret law from the state courts, which at present is the only 
major type of IP law over which the states have primary 
jurisdiction. 
In sum, an FTSA would not only result in a uniform and 
consistent trade secret regime, but by placing trade secret 
regulation in the hands of Congress and the federal courts, it would 
also ensure that the major forms of IP—patent, trademark, 
copyright, and trade secret—are all part of a cohesive national IP 
policy. 
III. THREE REASONS NOT TO ENACT AN FTSA, AND WHY THOSE 
REASONS ARE UNPERSUASIVE 
To assess the merits of an FTSA, one must balance the reasons 
for enactment with those against it.  Indeed, arguments against an 
FTSA prevailed when proposals for some form of federal trade 
secret law were presented to the American Bar Association’s 
Section of Intellectual Property in 199297 and the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) in 2007.98  This 
 
 96 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 472–93 (discussing the interaction between 
patent law and trade secret protection). 
 97 Resolution 410-1 read in full:  “RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark 
and Copyright Law favors in principle the passage of a federal law (preempting state law) 
for the protection of trade secrets; and specifically, the Section favors the passage of such 
a law based upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” 1992–93 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. 
ANN. REP. 1, 329.  But a federal trade secret law was rejected in 1992, and was not 
proposed in 1993 because “additional evaluation . . .  [needed to] be made of the benefits 
and detriments of federal trade secret protection before any such resolution . . . [should] 
again [be] submitted.” Id. 
 98 AIPLA REPORT, supra note 35 (“Based on the information it has obtained and 
reviewed, the Committee does not at this time recommend any federal legislation focused 
on trade secret law.”). 
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Part of the Article summarizes the three main arguments against an 
FTSA and demonstrates that those arguments are not persuasive.99 
Before those arguments, however, I address the (non)argument 
that trade secret law has long been a state-based law, and since the 
system isn’t broken, there is no reason to fix it.  For example, the 
AIPLA argued that “current state regulation of trade secrets . . . is 
functioning adequately. . . .”100  This reasoning fails because the 
system is broken for the four reasons detailed above, which 
demonstrate that the state-based system has not kept up with our 
information-based economy and should be replaced.  So while 
there may be three reasons not to enact an FTSA, inertia is not one 
of them. 
A. An FTSA Would Not Harm the Principle of Federalism 
Opponents of an FTSA make constitutional and policy 
arguments based on federalism.  The constitutional argument—
federalizing trade secret law is an unconstitutional usurpation of 
state sovereignty—has already failed.  In 1996, Congress passed 
the Economic Espionage Act, which makes misappropriation of 
trade secrets a federal crime.101  In doing so, Congress recognized 
that it was federalizing a new type of IP: “For many years federal 
law has protected intellectual property through the patent and 
copyright laws.  With this legislation, Congress will extend vital 
federal protection to another form of proprietary economic 
information—trade secrets.”102  Since its passage, no one has 
claimed that Congress did not have the authority to federalize trade 
secret law.  And any such challenge would surely fail because, as 
detailed above in Part I.B, trade secrets have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce and would thus easily qualify under the 
 
 99 Rejections by the ABA and AIPLA do not end the debate because these rejections 
did not address all of the reasons this Article advances. See, e.g., id. (considering only 
arguments for substantive uniformity, judicial efficiency, and compliance with 
international treaties). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 102 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4  (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4022–
23; see also S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 5 (1996). 
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Commerce Clause.103  A federalism challenge would also fail 
because, in addition to the Economic Espionage Act, there are 
many federal statutes that touch on trade secrets and pass 
constitutional muster.104  These include the National Stolen 
Property Act105 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.106   
The federalism policy argument—there are benefits to a state-
based trade secret law that would be lost upon federalization—is 
also unpersuasive.  This argument ignores the economic realities 
explained in Part II.B that a state-based trade secret regime is 
incompatible with both the informational nature and national 
economic implications of trade secrets.  This argument also fails as 
an empirical matter.  The primary policy argument is that states 
have unique issues that require unique solutions, and that states 
should be laboratories to experiment and devise solutions.  The 
fact that forty-six states have passed the UTSA, however, 
empirically shows that states value uniform trade secrets laws over 
experimental ones.  And while there are differences between states, 
these differences arise haphazardly and with little recognition or 
justification of the differences. 
A final, federalism-based argument is that trade secret law is 
closely connected to other state-based laws, such as breach of 
contract (if the misappropriation is also governed by contract, such 
as nondisclosure, noncompetition, nonsolicitation, employment, or 
invention-assignment agreements), breach of fiduciary duty (if the 
misappropriation would violate a duty owed to the trade secret 
owner), employment law (if the misappropriation was by an 
employee), or torts (if the misappropriation involves another tort, 
 
 103 See Lao, supra note 13, at 1679–90 (arguing that a civil FTSA would be 
constitutional under either the Commerce Clause or the Foreign Affairs Clause).  In the 
Senate Report accompanying the Economic Espionage Act, the Senate based its authority 
to pass the Act on both the IP Clause and the Commerce Clause. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 
4 (1996); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (IP Clause); id. cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).  The 
former seems hard to justify for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  The Commerce Clause, however, provides a complete and sufficient basis for 
federal action. 
 104 See generally Jerry Cohen, Federal Issues in Trade Secret Law, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 
(2003). 
 105 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2006). 
 106 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
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such as interference with contractual or business relations).  One 
could argue that since these laws are state-based, keeping trade 
secret law at the state level would further a unified contract, 
fiduciary, employment, and tort policy.  This criticism falls short 
because in each of the other state-based laws there is something 
else at play besides the trade secret itself, such as a contract, 
fiduciary duty, employment obligation, or tort.  These laws have 
different elements and serve different purposes.  Trade secret laws, 
by contrast, are a type of IP law and thus would benefit from 
having Congress and the federal courts as the unified voice of IP 
policy. 
B. An FTSA Would Not Overburden the Federal Judiciary 
Some commentators argue that providing federal subject-
matter jurisdiction for civil trade secret cases would overburden 
the federal judiciary.107  While it’s true that federal courts are busy 
and becoming busier,108 the pertinent question is not whether an 
FTSA would add to the caseload of the federal judiciary, for it 
surely would.  Instead, the question is whether federal or state 
courts are better able to handle the burden of trade secret litigation.  
The answer is federal courts, as the data have long shown that state 
courts have more cases, their dockets are growing at a faster rate, 
and they have fewer resources.109  Given these statistics, the issue 
of caseload actually supports enacting an FTSA. 
Another argument based on burden is that providing a federal 
forum for all trade secret cases would cause a concomitant rise in 
 
 107 See, e.g., AIPLA REPORT, supra note 35 (“Others have argued, and the Committee 
agrees, that the current state regulation of trade secrets, although far from perfect, is 
functioning adequately and that federalizing state trade secret law would, therefore, 
needlessly burden the already overworked federal judiciary.”). 
 108 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 9–10 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM 
(describing the burden of the federal courts and how federal caseload is exceeding the 
creation of new judgeships). 
 109 See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal 
Case Out of It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 151–52 (2003) 
(describing each of these factors and the data that support them); Burt Neuborne, The 
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1977). 
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other types of litigation through supplemental jurisdiction.110  It is 
this supplemental jurisdiction, one could argue, that would impose 
the burden on federal courts, as many trade secret cases include 
other state-based causes of action.  Even if true, this criticism still 
supports enacting an FTSA because it would only further relieve 
the greater burden faced by state courts.  Moreover, this criticism 
is a strong argument against exclusive jurisdiction, which would 
require all trade secret cases, and their supplemental causes of 
action, to be heard in federal court.  Federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction in patent and copyright cases.111  This criticism does 
not apply to concurrent jurisdiction, as I propose, which would 
permit both state and federal courts to hear trade secret cases.  
Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in trademark 
cases.112 
It also warrants noting that an FTSA would enhance judicial 
efficiency by removing the substantive and procedural differences 
identified in Part II.A.  Accordingly, while the raw number of trade 
secret cases would increase in federal courts, part of the burden of 
those cases (i.e., addressing substantive and procedural differences 
and choice-of-law issues) would disappear.  An FTSA would also 
assist courts by providing them with a large, national pool of 
precedents instead of their current, smaller state-based pools.  At 
present, each state has its own, autonomous body of trade secret 
precedent.  Courts in populous states with innovative industries 
have larger bodies of precedent.  To illustrate, from 2000 to 2009, 
there were 293 trade secret decisions from California state courts 
and 120 such decisions in New York state courts; over the same 
time period there was one trade secret decision in Wyoming state 
courts, four such decisions in North Dakota state courts, and five 
such decisions in Vermont state courts.113  Courts in smaller states 
 
 110 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (defining the civil procedure mechanism of supplemental 
jurisdiction). 
 111 Id. § 1338(a). 
 112 See id. 
 113 I searched all cases in WESTLAW for each state database (i.e., California (“CA-
CS”), New York (“NY-CS”) Wyoming (“WY-CS”), Vermont (“VT-CS”), and North 
Dakota (“ND-CS”)) that satisfied the following search: ATLEAST3(“TRADE 
SECRET!”) & DA(AFT 12/31/1999 & BEF 01/01/2009).  This search is obviously 
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thus have to address, as issues of first impression, questions of 
trade secret law that have been decided elsewhere.  Courts in 
smaller states can and do look to other states for persuasive 
authority.  But those courts must still review their own authority to 
ensure it does not conflict with the persuasive authority, and, 
assuming it presents no conflict, courts may then choose to 
incorporate that persuasive authority.  These steps would become 
unnecessary under an FTSA. 
C. An FTSA Would Create a Precedent Vacuum, but it Would Be 
Filled Quickly 
One could argue that an FTSA would, upon passage, create a 
vacuum in which there would be no precedent to apply.  There is 
some truth to this concern, as there would be some period of time 
in which courts would have to develop a body of federal trade 
secret law.  Yet this concern will have little effect because, as a 
practical matter, any FTSA should and would likely be similar to 
the UTSA.  As detailed above in Part I, forty-six states have some 
version of the UTSA, and the other major modern trade secret 
statute, the Economic Espionage Act, is itself based in large part 
on the UTSA.114  An FTSA will thus not create a complete 
vacuum, as courts will be able to incorporate and use UTSA-based 
precedent. 
Moreover, federal courts already have substantial experience 
with trade secret litigation and thus will need little if any time to 
get up to speed.  Federal courts have long decided state-based trade 
secret cases either through diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.  
And since 1996, federal courts have decided trade secret cases 
under the Economic Espionage Act. 
 
imperfect, for not every case that mentions “trade secret” at least three times applies 
substantive trade secret law, but it is a reasonable proxy of volume. 
 114 POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 16, § 13.03[2] (describing how the definitions 
in the Economic Espionage Act were based on the UTSA). 
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CONCLUSION: ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL FTSA 
The point of this Article is to demonstrate that Congress should 
enact an FTSA.  To reap the benefits described above, an FTSA 
must have three elements.  First, it must be based in large part on 
the UTSA, which has experienced widespread acceptance and has 
a deep well of precedent.  Previous commentators have also argued 
for an FTSA based on the UTSA.115  And while other 
commentators have argued for an FTSA based on amending the 
Economic Espionage Act to include civil actions,116 the Economic 
Espionage Act is already based in large part on the UTSA and thus 
accomplishes the same end.  Accordingly, the first element is met 
by either the independent creation of an FTSA or the addition of a 
civil remedy to the Economic Espionage Act. 
Second, the FTSA must preempt inconsistent state trade secret 
laws, as the only way to eliminate differences between states is to 
preempt state laws.  This preemption is limited to state trade secret 
laws as such—namely, causes of action based on the UTSA or the 
tort of trade secret misappropriation.  An FTSA should not 
preempt the broad swath of trade secret-like laws, such as breach 
of noncompetition or nondisclosure agreements.  These other laws 
have a long history.  They have different elements and serve 
different aims than trade secret laws.  They should thus retain 
independent status. 
Third, an FTSA must have concurrent jurisdiction.  An FTSA 
with exclusive jurisdiction would sweep up too many state-based 
causes of action, as trade secret cases often have causes of action 
related to employment and contract law.  A litigant should have the 
option of federal or state court.  This third element interacts with 
the second, for while a litigant can choose federal or state court, 
both courts would apply the same FTSA. 
The past seventy years (from the Restatement in 1939 until 
today) have confirmed that a state-based trade secret law inevitably 
results in interstate differences and that these differences, in turn, 
 
 115 See, e.g., Pace, supra note 16, at 442–69. 
 116 See, e.g., Halligan, supra note 34, at 656–57 (“The time has come for the enactment 
of a federal trade secrets statute.  This Article recommends amendments to the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 to create a civil cause of action.”). 
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cause a host of problems.  It is time for trade secrets to join the 
other types of IP at the federal level, as there are no real benefits to 
keeping the state-based regime, and, as articulated in this Article, 
there are at least four reasons to enact an FTSA. 
 
